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EUROPEAN UNION 
DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
REPLY COMMENTS TO THE FCC'S FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE-MAKING 97. 
252 BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES 
1. The Delegation of the European Commission presents its compliments to the Department of 
State and has the honour to refer to the Further Notice of Proposed Rule-Making FCC 97-252 
(hereafter Further NPRM) adopted by the Federal Communications Commission {FCC) on July 
16, 1997 in the matter of Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-
U.S.-Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Services in the 
United States. 
2. The European Community and its Member States welcome the opportunity to comment 
granted by the FCC. We highly appreciate that the FCC issued this Further NPRM as it shows 
the FCC's willingness to fulfil its commitments to revise its proposed rules of 1996 governing 
the possibility for non-U.S.-licensed space stations to provide domestic and international 
satellite services in the United States, as a result of the World Trade Organisation (WfO) 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. 
3. The European Community and its Member States invite the FCC to provide further clarification 
as to the compatibility of its proposed rules with the GATS multilateral trading system. 
4. The European Community and its Member States consider that it is essential at this stage to 
avoid taking any action that may jeopardise the effective implementation by WTO Member 
countries of their commitments undertaken und~r the WTO/GATS Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications Services. In this context, the European Community and its Member 
States have concerns with the potential negative impact that the rules proposed In this 
Further NPRM could have on the implementation by the other WTO Members of their 
commitments. 
5. The European Community and its Member States support the FCC's proposal in the 
Further NPRM 97-252 not to apply the Effective Competitive Opportunities (ECO-Sat) 
analysis for evaluating requests by wro Member satellite systems to provide covered 
services within the United States, or between the United States and other WTO member 
countries, in light of the new competitive environment. We have howE.ver the following two 
general concerns with the FCC's proposed approach, which were already expressed in our 
comments to NPRM 97-142 of 4 June 1997 in the matter of Rules and Policies on Foreign 
Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market: 
a) the Further NPRM proposes to maintain broad and unclear public interest factors such 
as law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade concerns in determining whether to grant or deny 
authorisations to provide satellite services.. The European Community and its Member States 
have strong concerns on the compatibility of such public interest concepts with the GATS/WTO 
principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and transparency, as well as the U.S. MFN and 
market access obligations. We believe that the U.S. endorsement of the \NfO Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications Services clearty· indicates that WfO Members already satisfy the 
public interest objectives contained in the Notice, which thus cannot be · appl~. tc> ~o 
Members; 
b) the second major concern of the European· Commun~.,.. Ill~,-- ls.#18:~ 
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of such a broad and unclear concept as a "very fl1lh rtak to conqielllon* iii.the US satelite 
market as a justification for refusing a licence. Such an approach would erect additional 
burdens for foreign companies wishing to enter the U.S. satellite market. which would be 
subject to challenges by their competitors based on unclear conditions and criteria. The 
European Community and its Member States have concerns about the compatibility of such 
broad and vague competition policy objectives with the GA TS Agreement. 
6. The European Community and its Member States in addition wish to express the following 
specific comments regarding the FCC's Further Notice of Proposed Rule-Making 97-252: 
Retention of the ECO-Sat Test for services exempt from most-fayoured-nation obligations 
(further NPRM paragraphs 20-22) 
7. At the very end of the GATS Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Services, the U.S. 
tabled an exemption from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations for the one-way satellite 
transmission of DTH (direct-to-home) and DBS (digital broadcasting) television services, and 
of digital audio (DARS) services. At the time, the European Community and its Member States 
expressed concerns about the U.S. MFN-exemption, and reserved their rights within the WTO 
framework to challenge it. 1 These concerns remain valid. 
8. The Further NPRM FCC 97-252 asserts in paragraph 20 that "The United States took this 
[MFN-J exemption because the commitments made by other WTO members, including many of 
its major trading partners, do not provide for market access for DTH-FSS, DBS, or DARS. This 
created a potential market access imbalance between the United States and its largest trading 
partners [. . .]. The United States resolved this imbalance by taking an exemption from most-
favoured-nation obligations of the GA TS for these services. n As a result, the FCC proposes to 
apply the ECO-Sat test to all requests for access by non-U.S. satellite systems for the 
delivery of these services. 
9. The European Community and its Member States take note of the above mentioned 
justification put forward by the United States to justify the MFN-exemption. However, we do 
not share this analysis on the following grounds: 
a) In 1993 as a result of the Uruguay Round Negotiations the U.S. undertook commitments 
under the GATS on "radio and television services", "radio and television transmission 
services" and "other audiovisual services". These commitments did not exclude any 
particular technology; 
b) Furthermore, in the context of negotiations on specific services areas, such as 
those on Basic Telecommunications, WTO Members cannot take MFN-exemptions on 
1 See the declaration made by the European Communities and their Member States at the \freting of the 





services which do not fall under the scope- of.these negotiations. ___ the European 
Community and its Member states hold the view that.the one-way~- tra~ of 
0TH and DBS television S8IVices and of digital ·aucfio .~ do flOl f!l.l 0~,~~ of 
the 1997 Agreement on Basic relecommu~~; -w. note that tfi)).s>~~~ ·1Jle 
view that one-way 0TH, DBS and digltaf audio services do not fall under the ;ic:o,,eof the--~ 
Telecommunications Agreement, as clearly stated on the cover page of ·1ts February 1997 
Offer:2 -. •• these services [DTH, DBS and digital audio services} are conslder8d basic 
telecommunications in the United States but are not part of these negotlatlonll" (emphasis 
added). 
10.ln addition, the U.S. MFN-exemption might negatively Impact the economic vtablllty of 
non-U.S.-licensed satellite systems, since satellite systems normally provide both 
telecommunications (voice, data, video), and DTH-DBS transmission services ('mixed' 
systems). Over the past years, the trend toward bundling video programming with 
telecommunications and information services has even accelerated. The question thus arises 
how the FCC would evaluate applications from non-U.S.-licensed satellite systems to provide 
both basic telecommunications and DTH-DBS services. 
11.The scope and economic impact of the U.S. MFN-exemption depend on the precise 
definition of DTH and DBS television services, and of digital audio services. We invite the 
FCC to provide a precise definition of "one-way satellite transmission of DTH and DBS 
television services and of digital audio services", notably with respect to the coverage of the 
transmission of programmes to cable network head-ends, between operators ( contribution 
links), and the future generation of interactive services via satellite. 
12.Thus, the European Community and its Member States request the FCC to reconsider its 
proposal contained in paragraph 21 of the Further NPRM 97-252, and not to apply the ECO-
Sat test to requests for access by WTO-Members satellite systems for the delivery of 
one-way satellite transmission of DTH and DBS television services and of digital audio 
services, in the light of the WTO/GATS Agreement 
13. Furthermore, we note with great concern the FCC's intention possibly, in the future, to adopt 
more restrictive rules and policies for granting authorisations to provide Direct-to-Home (DTH) 
and Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) services. As stated in paragraph 22 of the Further 
NPRM, "In light of certain comments received in response to the initial DISCO II Notice, we 
wish to clarify that the specific foreign ownership and public interest rules that will be applied to 
DTH-FSS and DBS services will be addressed in separate Commission proceedings". The 
European Community and its Member States strongly recommend that, in light of its 
comprehensive commitments on audio-visual services at the end of the Uruguay Round, the 
United States should not impose new, more burdensome, conditions for the grant of 
authorisations to provide DTH-FSS and DBS services. 
Retention of the ECO-Sat Test for Non-WTO-Member markets served by WTO-Member 
Satellites (Further NPRM, paragraphs 25-28) 
~ Communication from the L'nited States: Conditional Offer (Revision). S GBT'\\' 1 1 Add.2 Rev.1 of 12 
February 1997. 
14. The FCC requests comments, in paragraph 28, on whether it should apply an ECO-Sat test to 
the non-WTO route markets in cases where the applicant that seeks to provide service 
between the United States and a non-WTO member country u- a satellite llcenl8d by a 
WTO member counby. The Community and its Member States are of the opinion that the 
application of the ECO-Sat test to non-WTO route markets in case of satellites licensed by a 
WTO Member would violate the U.S. national treatment commitments undertaken under the 
GA TS Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services in the GATS framework, and is thus 
not permissible. We therefore give our full support to the aftemative solution presented by 
the FCC in paragraph 27, namely that: • ... we could give WTO satellites the same flexlb/1/ty 
as we now give U.S. satellites [via the DISCO I Order]. This would mean that we would not 
apply an ECO-Sat test in cases involving WTO-member satellites, regardless of the route 
marlcef' (emphasis added). Given its GATS commitments on national treatment, the U.S. shall 
accord to WTO-Member-licensed satellites and to the services they provide treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own, U.S.-licensed satellites and to their services. As a 
consequence, the treatment of U.S. licensed and WTO-Member-licensed satellite systems 
must be harmonised, regardless of the route market they serve. 
Bilateral Agreements (Further NPRM, paragraphs 29-30) 
15. The FCC mentions in paragraph 29 its intention of pursuing its "overriding goal of enhancing 
competition in all satellite services by opening global markets" by entering in the future into 
bilateral agreements for the provision of satellite services with other countries. As an example 
of such agreements, the FCC cites the recently completed bilateral U.S.-Mexico Agreement on 
the provision of DTH-FSS and DBS services. 3 The FCC proposes, on the basis of the U.S. 
MFN-exemption on DTH, DBS and digital audio services, not to apply the ECO-Sat test to 
applications by non-U.S. satellites (for the provision of DTH, DBS and digital audio services) 
if the applications are covered by a bilateral satellite services agreement. Regarding this 
FCC proposal, the Community and its Member States repeat their comments made under the 
point 'Retention of the ECO-Sat Test for services exempt from most-favoured-nation 
obligations' above. 
Possibility to deny licenses to the future affiliates of Intergovernmental satellite 
Organisations (IGOs) on the ground of a "very high risk to competition" in the u.s. 
satellite market (Further NPRM paragraphs 34-36) 
16. The European Community and its Member States welcome and strongly support the 
FCC's proposal in paragraph 35 "not to apply the ECO-Sat test to applications to use 
satellites of /GO affiliates if the affiliates are companies of WTO Member countries" --
i.e. incorporated and engaged in substantive business operations in a WTO Member country's 
territory. In this respect, we recommend the U.S. to take note of the GATS definition of a 
"juridical person of another Member" (Art. XXVlll(m)J. 
3 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United 
Mexican States Concerning the Transmission and Reception of Signals from Satellites for the Provision of 
Satellite Services to Users in the United States of America and the United Mexican States. April .26. 1996. 
As well as the related Protocol Concerning the Transmission and Reception of Signals from Satellites for 
the Pro\'ision of Direct-to-Home Satellite Ser\'ices in the L"nited States of America and the L'nited 
\le:xican States of'\c,vernber 8. l 9%. 
., 
However, the European Community and its Member States are highly concerned about the 
furttler scrutiny and market entry baniers on the basis of an alleged •significant .ris!< to 
competition in the US satellites marker to which the FCC intends to subject affi1iatei of IGOs. 
We are concerned in pa,ticular, by the following ~ rilade by the F~ tn~~tllg"°'1 · 35 
·[. .. ] in the WTO negotiations, the United States ptNefV8d if.s ·ablllty to protect tfomi,stJtJon in 
the u. s. market, Including· the poa/blllty of not granting matlcet accea ,o· a future 
privileged /GO affiliate.~ and paragraph 36 of its Further NPRM ·AccorrJ/ng/y, upon 
appropriate application, we propose to review the affiliate's relationship to its /GO parent to 
ensure that grant would not pose a significant risk to competition in the U.S. satellite 
market and that the affiliate is structured to prevent such practices as collusive behaviour, 
cross-subsidisation, and denial of market access, and that the affiliate does not benefit directly 
or indirectly from /GO privileges and immunities. This review could result in denial of 
license or conditioning access to the U.S. market by the /GO affiliaten (emphasis added). 
17.ln this respect, the European Community and its Member States reiterate the reply comments 
made to the FCC NPRM 97-142 ('Foreign Participation' Order and Notice of Proposed Rule-
Making). We wish in particular to stress again the following major concerns, most of which 
have been addressed also in our Reply comments regarding the FCC's 'Foreign Participation' 
Order and NPRM: 
a) The U.S. intends to deny access to its satellite market to IGO affiliates "if that could pose 
a very high risk to competition in satellite services to, from, and within the United States". The 
European Community and its Member States view the latter criteria as too broad and unclear. 
For the U.S. to keep such a high degree of discretion regarding access to its market - as 
suggested by the criteria of "very high risk to competition" -- would be against the letter and 
spirit of the GATS general obligations and disciplines, as well as the U.S. specific market 
access commitments; 
b) IGO affiliates will already be subject to a number of disciplines and pro-competitive 
safeguards as a result of the commitments undertaken by WTO Members under the Reference 
Paper. In addition, the restructuring processes of IGOs will be examined under appropriate 
competition law. As a consequence, IGO affiliates will already be subject to the prohibition of 
anti-competitive practices, and to safeguards preventing inter alia cross-subsidisation. 
Therefore, the Community and its Member States consider that some of the 'tests' to which the 
FCC intends to submit IGO affiliates ("to ensure that the affiliate is structured to prevent such 
practices as collusive behaviour, cross-subsidisation, and denial of market access, and that 
the affiliate does not benefit directly or indirectly from /GO privileges and immunities") could 
potentially lead to an over-regulation of these affiliates. Thus, we strongly recommend 
the United States not to create unnecessary burdensome regulations for reviewing 
applications. Instead, the United States should rely much more on the fundamentally 
improved conditions of competition in satellite services that will result from the successful 
conclusion of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services -- as recognised by the 
FCC in its Further NPRM (see paragraphs 2, 13, 16, 17, etc.). In our view, promoting an 
open and competitive market for satellite services is a far more efficient means of 
serving the public interest than intense regulatory scrutiny. 
Other Public Interest Considerations: Spectrum Availability and Technical Co-ordination 
(Further NPRM, paragraph 38) 
18. The European Community and its Member States wish to recaU that. according to the 
Chaianao'1 Note on Martcet Access Uroifations on s~ Availabffilv .~egotiated in the 
framework of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunipations ~· each Mem1>t9r f,as the 
right to exen:lse spectrum I flaquency m.magement. ~ that lhls .Is (kx)(IJR ~
with Article VI and other relevant provisions of the"' GA T$ .. ·· Tliis ,-:~,~~that,~, 
' - . ·. ~ ·;:··:-~;_·· ...... ~,/- ·:··-,,.· ~ -
measures and decisions regarding allocation, assignment and ·technical· co-ordination are 
admlnlatered In a "reasonable, objective and Impartial manner", and do not nullfy or 
Impair a country'• specific commitments, i.e. not act in themselves as a disguised barrier to 
trade. In addition, the GA TS Reference Paper requires such allocation to be carried out •in an 
objective, timely, transpantnt and non-discriminatory manner". Any rules adopted by the 
FCC in this respect should be consistent with these principles. 
Compliance with Commission Rules and Policies (further NPRM, paragraphs 39::46) The 
FCC proposes in its paragraph 44 to •apply all applicable Commission rules and policies to all 
non-U. S. satellite systems that are eligible to serve the United States" . The European 
Community and its Member States wish to stress that all these rules and policies shall be 
consistent with the GATS general obligations and disciplines (such as MFN treatment, etc.) as 
well as with the U.S. specific market access and national treatment commitments. 
19.To conclude, on the basis of the above analysis, the European Community and its Member 
States request the United States to reconsider, where necessary, the proposals 
contained in its Further NPRM 97-252 to ensure that it is fully consistent with GATS 
principles. The European Community and its Member States also reaffirm their request to the 
U.S. to amend the remaining FCC's rules where necessary in order they do not conflict with 
GATS principles. 
20. The European Community and its Member States reserve their rights to challenge 
under the WTO dispute settlement procedures any rules to be proposed by the FCC that 
would be inconsistent with the U.S. general GATS obligations and disciplines, or with 
its specific market access and national treatment commitments. 
21. The Delegation of the European Commission would be grateful to receive the views of the 
Department of State, and requests that this Note Verbale be transmitted to the Federal 
Communications Commission so that it can be part of the proceedings in this matter and put in 
the public record. 
The Delegation of the European Commission avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the 
Department of State the assurance of its highest consideration. 
Washington·; DC 
4 September. 1997 
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